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Volume 97 Lead Piece

How Business Fares in the Supreme Court
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A.
†
Posner
1

2

A number of scholars, journalists, and at least one mem3
ber of Congress claim that the current Supreme Court (the
“Roberts Court”) is more favorable to business than previous

† Epstein is the Provost Professor of Law and Political Science and the
Rader Family Trustee Chair in Law at the University of Southern California.
Landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Law and Economics at
the University of Chicago Law School. Posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. Epstein thanks the National Science Foundation, and Landes and Posner the law and economics program at the University of Chicago,
for research support. We thank Lauren Barnett, Rachel Block, Sam Boyd,
Sean Cooksey, Brian Egan, Adina Goldstein, Michael Kenstowicz, Sonia LahrPostor, Connor Lynch, Emily Rush, Adam Solomon, and Mike Zhu for their
research assistance. We also thank Ryan Black and Ryan Owens for providing
their data on the Solicitor General and Paul Collins for making public his data
on amici curiae. All data used in this article are available at
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/businessSupCt.html. Copyright © 2013 by Lee
Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner. [Editor’s Note: This Article
is the lead piece for Volume 97.]
1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54
WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court is the most pro-business
Court of any since the mid-1930s.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008 (Magazine), at 38 (“The Supreme Court term that ended
last June was, by all measures, exceptionally good for American business.”).
2. See, e.g., Corporations and the Court, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2011, at
75; Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A1; Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case,
Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at B1.
3. See Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s
Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 112th Cong. 1–2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
S. Judiciary Comm.) (arguing that several recent Court decisions have unfairly empowered corporations at the expense of American consumers and employees, particularly in the areas of fraud and discrimination).
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Supreme Courts have been. Other commentators disagree,
while acknowledging that the Roberts Court is “less hostile to
6
enterprise than the Warren Court” was; one of these commen7
tators calls Wyeth v. Levine, a decision that business lost, “one
8
of the most significant decisions of the Roberts Court.” An intermediate position is that it may be too soon to assess “the
9
Roberts Court’s responsiveness to American business,” in part
because the Court tends to agree with the positions taken by
the Solicitor General of the United States, who during the first
several years of the Roberts Court was the appointee of a Republican President and so tended to support business. The debate raises the larger issue, which we address in this Article
along with the issue of the relative pro-business orientation of
the Roberts Court, of the role of ideology in decisions of the Su-

4. Mundy & Wang, supra note 2, at B1.
5. See, e.g., Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme
Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., supra note 3, at 9–11, 53 (statement of Robert Alt, Senior
Fellow and Deputy Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation) (arguing that the story of the Roberts Court as “procorporatist” is “fictional” and that in many important cases the Court sided
against business); Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the
Roberts Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 972
(2009) (“If the relative magnitude of the cases is taken into account, it is even
more difficult to argue that the Roberts Court has been ‘pro-business’ in this
area.”); Richard A. Epstein, Is the Supreme Court Tilting Right?, DEFINING
IDEAS
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas/article/61206 (“To be pro-business today does not carry the same meaning that it did in earlier periods, when the scope of regulation was in general
so much narrower.”); Martin J. Newhouse, Business Cases and the Roberts
Supreme Court, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www
.fed-soc.org/doclib/20111216_NewhouseEngage12.3.pdf (“In numerous cases
these Justices have cast their votes for, and even written the majority opinions
in, decisions in which business parties have lost and investors, consumers, or
employees have won.”).
6. Corporations and the Court, supra note 2, at 75.
7. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
8. “The Court’s decision [in Wyeth] abruptly ended the efforts of the Bush
administration to block private tort actions attacking the warnings which appear on drug labels and that are issued and approved by the FDA.” Epstein,
supra note 5.
9. Sri Srinivasan & Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, the Roberts Court,
and the Solicitor General: Why the Supreme Court’s Recent Business Decisions
May Not Reveal Very Much, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2009).
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preme Court, a focus of our recent book on judicial behavior,
though the book does not emphasize business cases.
In assessing the role of ideology in the Supreme Court,
there is value in looking at a subset of cases, such as business
cases. For there is no uniform conservative or uniform liberal
ideology. Instead there are multiple imperfectly overlapping
ideologies. For example, “Cold War liberals” (the standard example was Senator Henry Jackson of Washington; another was
Justice Abe Fortas) are liberal in all respects except national
defense and (sometimes) internal security. Libertarians are
hostile to government in all respects, and therefore are conservative in business cases but liberal in most other cases. Social
conservatives may be liberal with respect to the regulation of
business but conservative in all other respects; that is, they
may be pro-regulation across the board. Such differences can
make it difficult or even impossible to distinguish between “liberal” and “conservative” Justices. However, it should be possible (and we endeavor in this Article) to distinguish between
business-liberal and business-conservative Justices.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the databases we use to study the Court’s business decisions. Part II
uses these databases to study the pattern over time of the
Court’s pro- and anti-business decisions, the ideological implications of the pattern, and, related to ideology, the correlation
between coding decisions as conservative or liberal and coding
them as business wins or business loses. Part III analyzes the
voting behavior of the individual Justices, as distinct from the
Court’s actual decisions. We rank the Justices in terms of how
favorable or unfavorable they are toward business, and relate
each Justice’s leaning for or against business to his preappointment ideology, the lower-court decision in the cases the
Justice voted on, the federal government’s participation in the
case, and the filing of amicus curiae briefs for or against business. The conclusion summarizes our findings.

10. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
HAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
TIONAL CHOICE (2013).

BERA-
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I. DATA
We mainly use two databases that we created. The first,
the Business Litigant Dataset, consists of the 1759 cases that
were orally argued in the Supreme Court’s 1946 through 2011
Terms in which a business entity was either a petitioner or a
respondent but not both. The party opposing the business litigant may have been an employee or job applicant, a shareholder or other stakeholder, a nonbusiness organization (such
as a union or an environmental group), or a government
agency.
The second dataset, the Business versus Business Dataset,
consists of the 255 cases orally argued in the Supreme Court’s
1946 through 2011 Terms in which there was a business entity
on both sides of the case. It might seem odd to use cases in
which both adversaries are business entities to measure probusiness sentiment; whatever the outcome, business wins. But
business is not an undifferentiated mass from an ideological
standpoint. Liberals tend to support small business and conservatives big business, at least when small and big businesses
are on opposite sides of a case. If a small firm sues a large one,
accusing it of using predatory pricing in an effort to destroy the
small one, a decision in favor of the small firm will be a liberal
decision and a decision in favor of the large firm a conservative
one. Or both parties might be small or both large yet one might
be espousing a position that would generally favor small or
large firms and the other espousing the opposite position. We
have classified decisions in our Business versus Business Dataset as liberal when they favor small business or oppose business interests in general and conservative when they favor big
business or favor business interests in general.
We also use a subset of the Business Litigant Dataset that
consists of 465 cases in which the New York Times published a
story about the Court’s decision either on the front page or in
11
the business section; we call this subset NYT. Of those 465
cases, 189 were covered only on the front page, 250 only in the
business section, and 26 in both places. We expect the Times to

11. This is a variant of Epstein and Segal’s measure of overall salience,
which considers only whether the New York Times gave the case front-page
coverage on the day the Court decided it. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000).

2013]

BUSINESS IN THE SUPREME COURT

1435

cover the most important business cases, and the most important Supreme Court case in any field is likely to involve an
ideological division—otherwise either the Court would not have
bothered to take the case or the readership of a newspaper
would be uninterested in the outcome.
To create our datasets we started with the U.S. Supreme
Court Database, originally created by the lawyer and political
scientist Harold J. Spaeth. The “Spaeth Database”—or
“Spaeth” as we will usually call it—contains hundreds of pieces
of information about every Supreme Court case decided in or
12
since the 1946 Term. Information from the Spaeth Database
that we use in our study includes the votes of each Justice, the
decision of the lower court, the subject matter of the case, and
whether a business entity was the petitioner or the respon13
dent. From the Spaeth Database and other sources we obtained data on additional factors likely to influence decisions
and votes, such as ideology, whether the Solicitor General participated in the case, and whether the Chamber of Commerce
filed an amicus curiae brief.
Classifying the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset as
for or against business is complicated by the fact that a decision
favoring (disfavoring) the business party does not necessarily
favor (disfavor) the overall interest of the business community.
Suppose a generic-drug manufacturer sues the FDA because
manufacturers of patented drugs have persuaded the agency
that the generic manufacturers are not doing enough testing of
their drugs before putting them on the market. If they lose, the
decision would be coded as anti-business but actually it would
be pro-big-business. Rather than analyze separately each of the
1759 decisions in the Business Litigant Dataset, however, we
classify every decision in favor of the business litigant as a decision in favor of business.
As shown in Figure 1, there has been a modest but statistically significant average decline of 0.3% per Term in the fraction of cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and a smaller but
still significant average decline of 0.2% per Term in a broader

12. Harold Spaeth et al., THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://
supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
13. We exclude cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction, such as
cases concerning boundary disputes between states.
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All Business Dataset of 2479 cases. There has also been
(though it is not shown in Figure 1) a decline in the absolute
number of cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, and in the
broader business dataset as well, that is consistent with the
overall decline in the Supreme Court’s caseload. For example,
the number of business cases in the Business Litigant Dataset
averaged 36.6 per Term in the 1946 to 1952 Terms, compared
to only 11 per Term since 2005; in the broader business dataset
the decline is from an average of 46.1 to an average of 22.1.
Figure 1
Fraction of Orally Argued Cases Involving Business

14. The All Business Dataset includes 1759 cases in the Business Litigant
Dataset plus 255 cases in the Business versus Business Dataset plus 465 other
business cases in which the non-business party was not one of the covered
categories in the Business Litigant Dataset. The regressions of fraction of
business cases on term for the 1946–2011 Terms are:
Bus. Litigant Dataset = 5.92 - .0029 Term
(9.00) (8.63)
All Bus. Dataset = 3.77 - .0017 Term
(4.63) (4.21)
where Bus. Litigant Dataset = the number of cases in the Business Litigant
Dataset as a fraction of all orally argued cases; All Bus. Dataset = the number
of cases involving business (without regard to the opposing party) as a fraction
of all orally argued cases; and Term = Term of the Court by year. The difference between the regression coefficients on the Term variable in the two equations is statistically significant.
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The business litigant prevailed in 38% of the cases in the
Business Litigant Dataset—27% of the 951 cases in which
business was the respondent and 52% of the 808 cases in which
it was the petitioner. Of the individual Justices’ votes, as distinct from decisions, 40% were in favor of business and 60% opposed. Business litigants fared worse than the average nonbusiness litigant in the Supreme Court: petitioners won 63% of
the non-business cases (versus 52% of the business cases) and
respondents won 37% (versus 27%); these differences between
the two groups of litigants are statistically significant. The differences are correlated with the fact that, as will be noted in
Part III, the Court is less likely to grant certiorari to a business
petitioner than to a non-business petitioner.
II. BUSINESS DECISIONS AND IDEOLOGY CODING
The Business Litigant Dataset departs from the approach
that political scientists have taken to analyzing the Supreme
15
Court’s attitude toward business. The departure enables a
more precise understanding of that attitude.
Political scientists tend to select for study cases identified
16
in the Spaeth Database as involving “economic activity,” and
to treat whether the Court reached a liberal or a conservative
17
decision as a proxy for the Court’s attitude towards business.

15. The genesis is Glendon Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme
Court: A Psychological Analysis, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 90 (1962). See also
Harold J. Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The “B” Scale, in
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). More recent examples are Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, The Emergence of a New Ideology: The Business Decisions of the Burger Court, 54 J. POL. 120 (1992); Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An
Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801 (2009); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer
Beware: Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL.
RES. Q. 557 (2000) [hereinafter Segal, Buyer Beware]; Jeffrey A. Segal et al.,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57
J. POL. 812 (1995) [hereinafter Segal, Ideological Values]; Nancy Staudt, Lee
Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of Judging in the
Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797 (2006).
16. E.g., Segal, Ideological Values, supra note 15, at 813–15; C. Neal Tate,
Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 356–58, 362–63 (1981).
17. E.g., Sag et al., supra note 15, at 804–09; Segal, Buyer Beware, supra
note 15, at 562–68; Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra note 15, at 1812–15.
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The idea is that a conservative vote in the economic-activity
subset is pro-business and a liberal vote anti-business.
But many business cases are not in Spaeth’s “economic activity” category. An example is Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
18
Pena, a challenge to the federal provision of financial incentives to induce general contractors to hire minority subcontractors. While the cases comprising the economic activity category
form the modal category in our Business Litigant Dataset, 60%
of them are in other categories in the Spaeth Database, as
shown in Table 1. Even when we combine cases identified in
the Spaeth Database as involving economic activity, unions,
and federal taxation into a single category (which we call the
“core economic category”), 44% of the cases in our Business
Litigant Dataset are outside it. (And even the Business Litigant Dataset has omissions, because it is limited to cases in
which a business is the first named party, and so excludes cases
like Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v.
19
EPA, where the EPA was trying to block a state’s grant of a
mining permit to a business.)

18. 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
19. 540 U.S. 461, 468–69 (2004).
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Table 1
Issue Coverage in the Business Litigant Dataset,
1946–2011 Terms
Issue Area
Core Economic Areas
Economic Activity
Unions
Federal Taxation
Non-Core Economic Areas
Criminal Procedure
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Privacy
Attorneys
Judicial Power
Federalism
Miscellaneous/
Unidentified
Total Number of Cases/Votes

Cases

Votes of Justices

56.0%
(985)
39.9
(702)
12.6
(221)
3.5
(62)

56.0%
(8831)
39.9
(6301)
12.5
(1975)
3.5
(555)

43.9%
(774)
2.6
(46)
7.7
(135)
6.8
(119)
2.4
(42)
1.5
(27)
0.5
(9)
15.0
(263)
7.2
(126)
0.4
(7)

44.0%
(6951)
2.6
(412)
7.7
(1219)
6.8
(1069)
2.4
(378)
1.5
(243)
0.5
(81)
14.9
(2356)
7.2
(1130)
0.4
(63)

1759

15,782

Note: Number of cases and number of votes are in parentheses. Miscellaneous includes one case involving interstate relations.

We can obtain an idea of the significance of the Spaeth
omissions from data on the 178 amicus curiae briefs filed in the
Supreme Court by the Chamber of Commerce in the 1979
through 2006 Terms (the only period for which such data are
available). Of these, 140 were in cases in which a business entity was a named party, leaving 38 (21.4%) in which a business
was not a named party and so the case was not included in our
Business Litigant or Business versus Business datasets. But
the business community must have had an interest in those 38
cases as otherwise the Chamber would not have filed a brief.
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Although 21.4%is a substantial percentage number of misses,
the percentage of the 178 cases that fall outside Spaeth’s economic activity category is more than three times as great—
69.7%.
It is natural to expect decisions in favor of the business
litigant to be conservative and those in favor of the nonbusiness litigant liberal. Yet as Table 2 shows, in 67.5% of the
cases in our Business Litigant Database either the business
litigant wins and Spaeth classifies the decision as conservative
or the business litigant loses and Spaeth classifies it as lib20
eral. The last two columns in the table show similar results
for Justices’ votes.
Table 2
Overlap of Pro-Business/Anti-Business with Spaeth
Coding of Conservative /Liberal in the Business Litigant
Dataset
Ideology of
Decisions/Votes
Liberal
Conservative
Total

Decision
Business Wins Business Loses
35.9%
(241)
64.1
(430)
(671)

69.6%
(754)
30.4
(329)
(1083)

Justices’ Votes
Business Wins Business Loses
37.0%
(2267)
63.0
(3861)
(6128)

70.4%
(6360)
29.6
(2680)
(9040)

Notes:
(a) Number of cases or votes in parentheses.
(b) The table includes 1754, not 1759, cases because Spaeth was unable to code 5 cases
(45 votes) in the Business Litigant Dataset as either liberal or conservative.

The overlap varies across case categories. In what we are
calling the core economic category in the Spaeth Database, 87%
of the cases are business wins-conservative, business losesliberal. But this figure drops to 48% of business cases that
Spaeth places in the civil liberties category (cases involving
criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process,
privacy, and attorneys (because many attorney cases involve
either commercial speech or disbarment because of political

20. Spaeth was unable to classify as conservative or liberal 5 of the 1759
cases that turn up in our Business Litigant Dataset. These cases involved a
boundary dispute between two states and property disputes (including wills
and estates) that have no clear liberal or conservative side.
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views)). If we combine civil liberties, judicial power, and federalism cases (plus seven cases in a miscellaneous category) into
a non-core business category (consisting of 774 cases, which is
44% of the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset that we
noted earlier were not in either Spaeth’s economic activity
category or our core economic category), a business win is more
likely to have been coded liberal (55%) than conservative by
Spaeth and a business loss more likely to have been coded conservative (59%) than liberal. This is a puzzling result. While
some business wins are liberal—for example, a media business
winning a First Amendment case—others, including many that
Spaeth codes as liberal, such as a tobacco company obtaining
invalidation of a state law limiting cigarette advertising, would
be challenged by many liberals.
These results led us to question the accuracy of Spaeth’s
ideological classifications of business cases. Spaeth himself has
acknowledged that the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are
21
more difficult to apply to such cases. In an effort to assess the
accuracy of those classifications, Judge Posner read a random
sample of 48 cases in the non-core areas of the Spaeth Database that Spaeth coded as either a liberal decision when business won or a conservative decision when business lost. Posner,
who was not informed beforehand how Spaeth had coded them,
turned out to disagree with Spaeth in a surprisingly high 79%
of these cases. Posner decided that 27 cases that Spaeth had
coded liberal should have been coded conservative, or vice
versa, and that 11 cases that Spaeth had coded liberal or conservative were unclassifiable—that is, had no discernible ideo-

21. “The term liberal represents the voting direction of the justices across
the various issue areas. It is most appropriate in the areas of civil liberties,
criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and
attorneys where it signifies pro-defendant votes in criminal procedure cases,
pro-women or pro-minorities in civil rights cases, pro-individual against the
government in First Amendment, due process, and privacy cases and proattorney in attorneys’ fees and bar membership cases. In takings clause cases,
however, a pro-government/anti-owner vote is considered liberal. The use of
the term is perhaps less appropriate in union cases, where it represents prounion votes against both individuals and the government, and in economic
cases, where it represents pro-government votes against challenges to federal
regulatory authority and pro-competition, anti-business, pro-liability, proinjured person, and pro-bankruptcy votes.” LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM 277 (5th ed. 2012).
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22

logical valence.
To create a more balanced sample, Posner, again without
looking up Spaeth’s classifications in advance, read 99 additional cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, 50 from the core
economic category and 49 from the non-core category, that
Spaeth had coded conservative when business won and liberal
23
when business lost. The percentage of disagreement between
Spaeth and Posner in the 99 cases was 19.2%. Posner decided
that 9 of the 99 should have been deemed unclassifiable and 10
should have been coded, whether conservative or liberal, opposite to Spaeth’s coding.
That made a total of 57 cases in the full sample of 147 in
which Posner disagreed with Spaeth—38.8%. But that figure
falls to 28.7% when the three constituent samples are weighted
by their percentage of the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset. The 28.7% figure is made up of 19.8% disagreement over
whether the outcome was liberal or conservative and 8.9% disagreement over whether the outcome could be classified either
way.

22. Originally it was a random sample of 50 cases, but we excluded two
because in each the “business” litigant was a health organization (Planned
Parenthood) that was not a business. Since only 9 of the 1759 cases in the
dataset were in the health organization category, errors from including such
cases (some of which, moreover, are businesses, such as community hospitals)
in the dataset would be negligible.
23. The original sample was 100 cases, but we excluded one that did not
involve business.
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Table 3 presents a summary analysis of the dataset, where
“Epstein-Landes-Posner” or “ELP” denote Posner’s coding of
the cases.
Table 3
Ideological Coding of Cases in the Business Litigant
Dataset
Business Litigant
Dataset

Core
Economic
Category
(1)

Non-Core Economic Category
Business
Business
Wins/Liberal or
Wins/Conserva
Business
tive or Business
Loses/Conservati
Loses/Liberal
ve
(2)
(3)
49
48

Number of Cases
50
Spaeth
Unclassifiable
0
0
0
Classifiable
50
49
48
Epstein-Landes-Posner
Unclassifiable
0
9
11
Classifiable
50
40
37
7
3
27
ELP Disagreement with
Spaeth in Classifiable
Cases
7
12
38
Total ELP Disagreement
(14%)
(24%)
(79%)
with Spaeth Cases
(% Disagreement)
Notes:
(a) Core Economic Category includes economic, union, and tax cases.
(b) The Non-Core Categories include criminal procedure, civil rights, first amendment, due process, privacy, attorneys, judicial power, federalism, and a miscellaneous category (consisting of only 7 cases in the Business Litigant Dataset.
(c) Total Disagreement with Spaeth is the sum of the unclassifiable and classifiable
disagreements.
(d) There are 48 rather than 50 cases in column (3) because two cases did not involve
a business entity.

We expect an even higher rate of disagreement with the
Spaeth codings in our Business versus Business Dataset, since
the cases in that dataset lack the obvious though potentially
misleading marker of a business win as conservative and a
business loss as liberal. Cutting against this expectation, however, is that often the fact that one party to a lawsuit is a business may have little to do with issues of interest to business.
For example, the issue in a case in the dataset might be
whether a litigant should have access to grand jury testimony;
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though the issue arose in a case in which a business was a
criminal defendant, the case would probably be significant for
criminal cases in general rather than for anything peculiar to
the prosecution of a business.
Posner read 149 of the 255 cases in the Business versus
Business Dataset, again without knowing beforehand how
Spaeth had coded them. The other 106 cases that he did not
read were cases that Spaeth, our research assistants, and Posner on the basis of brief summaries of the cases prepared by the
research assistants had all coded the same way. Table 4 summarizes the disagreement between Posner and Spaeth.
Table 4
Ideology Coding in Business versus Business Cases
Spaeth
Total Cases
Unclassified
Coded as Conservative
Coded as Liberal
Agree with Spaeth
Disagree with Spaeth
Unclassified by ELP but
Classified by Spaeth
Classified by ELP but Spaeth Classifies the
Opposite
Disagreement Rate
Agreement Rate

255
1
(0.4%)
115
(45.1%)
139
(54.5%)
—
—
—

Epstein-LandesPosner
255
44
(17.3%)
96
(37.6%)
115
(45.1%)
176
79
43

—

36

—

31.0%

—

69.0%

The table reveals a trivially higher rate of disagreement
with Spaeth (31%) in the Business versus Business Dataset
than the 28.7% weighted disagreement rate in the Business
Litigant Dataset. The principal disagreement regarding cases
in the Business versus Business Dataset concerns unclassifiable cases. Spaeth found only one; Posner found 44.
Table 5 examines one possible source of disagreement with
the Spaeth: Spaeth’s tendency to classify relatively more outcomes in business cases as liberal than as conservative (54.7%
liberal (= 139/254) in cases in our Business versus Business
Dataset and 57.1% liberal (= 84/147) in cases in our Business
Litigant Dataset). The data in Table 5 require us reject this
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hypothesis. In the Business versus Business Dataset we disagreed with the Spaeth Database’s conservative coding 32.2%
of the time and his liberal coding 30.2% of the time. In the
Business Litigant Dataset we disagreed with Spaeth’s conservative coding 58.7% of the time and its liberal coding only
23.8% of the time.
Table 5
Ideological Coding Disagreements
Spaeth Coding
Conservative
Liberal
Business versus Business
C
L
U
N
C
L
U
N
Epstein-Landes-Posner 67.8% 15.7% 16.5% 115 12.9% 69.8% 17.3% 139
(78)
(18)
(19)
(18)
(97)
(24)
Business Litigant Dataset
Epstein-Landes-Posner 41.3% 41.3% 17.5% 63 13.1% 76.2% 10.7% 84
(26)
(26)
(11)
(11)
(64)
(9)
Notes:
(a) C, L, and U refer to the classification by Epstein-Landes-Posner as a conservative,
liberal, or unclassifiable decision.
(b) N denotes the number of cases that Spaeth classified as either conservative (115) or
liberal (139).
(c) There are 254 cases (115 + 139) in the Business versus Business Dataset that
Spaeth coded as either conservative or liberal. He coded 1 case as unable to classify.
(d) There are 147 cases in the sample from the Business Litigant Dataset because we
determined that 3 cases did not involve businesses.

We do not expect a Justice’s ideological preferences to influence his vote in cases in which there are no ideological
stakes. Because ideological disagreement increases the likeli24
hood of dissent, we expect greater unanimity in such cases.
Table 6 tests this hypothesis by comparing the fraction of
unanimous decisions in unclassifiable cases to the fraction in
cases that we classified as either liberal or conservative. The
fraction is between 10 and 21% greater in the unclassifiable
cases. In spite of the small sample size, the results are still sta25
tistically significant in the Business Litigant Dataset.

24. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 10, at 256–72.
25. The significance level with respect to the fraction of cases in the Business versus Business Dataset with 0 dissents is p > .27.

1446

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1431

Table 6
Dissent in Classifiable versus
Unclassifiable Decisions
Business versus Business
Dataset
Epstein-Landes-Posner
C/L
U
(1)
(2)
43.1%
52.3%
10.0%
13.6%
18.5%
13.6%
17.1%
11.4%
11.4%
9.1%
211
44

Business Litigant
Dataset
Epstein-Landes-Posner
C/L
U
(3)
(4)
44.8%
70.0%*
13.4%
—
15.0%
5.0%
14.2%
20.0%
12.6%
5.0%
127
20

Dissenting
Votes
0
1
2
3
4
N
Notes:
(a) N is the number of cases.
(b) C/L denotes the case classified as either liberal or conservative.
(c) U denotes the case is unclassifiable.
(d) The asterisk * indicates that fraction of cases with 0 dissents is significantly different at the .05 level between classified (C/L) and unclassifiable (U) cases.

Figure 2 presents data on Justices’ voting in business
cases. In the next Part of the Article we use those votes to determine the attitude toward business of the individual Justices;
here we consider whether to use decisions or Justices’ votes to
determine changes over time in the Supreme Court’s attitude.
For each of the 36 Justices who voted in cases in our Business Litigant Dataset, we calculated the fraction of the Justice’s votes in favor of business and the fraction of votes coded
conservative by Spaeth, in core and non-core business cases. In
the core category a Justice’s ideology as measured by conservative votes turns out to be positively related to the fraction of
cases in which the Justice votes in favor of a business entity.
26
But there is no correlation in non-core cases. This implies that
ideology is a good proxy for measuring a Justice’s preference for

26. We regressed the fraction of business wins against the fraction of conservative votes for the core and non-core categories. The 36 observations in the
regressions (one for each Justice) are weighted by the number of votes of each
Justice in the particular category. The regression results are:
2
Core Categories: Fr. Bus. Win = .039 + .901(Fr. Con. Votes) R = .97
(3.49) (32.13)
2
Non-Core Categories: Fr. Bus. Win = .441–.011(Fr. Con. Votes) R = 0
(10.47) (0.14)
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business only in the core category. In fact the non-core cases
reveal a negative, though not statistically significant, relation
between the fraction of votes in favor of the business entity and
the fraction of conservative votes.
Figure 2
Business Wins Versus Ideology Coding

To analyze whether one Supreme Court era is friendlier to
business than another, we could use either the percentage of
decisions or the percentage of Justices’ votes that favored business. But the former is the better choice. Imagine that businesses win 90% of the cases in the Roberts Court by a vote of 5
to 4 and in the remaining 10% the vote is 9 to 0 against business. Then 50% of the total votes would favor business even
though businesses won 90% of the cases. And if businesses won
70% of the cases in the Rehnquist Court 7 to 2 and lost 30% 5
to 4, they would have won 68% of the votes compared to 50% in
the Roberts Court, yet a business party would have a 20%
greater chance of winning in the Roberts Court (90% versus
70%).
But the fractions of votes and of decisions supporting business per Term turn out to be highly correlated (= .91), so that,
as shown in Figure 3, both series yield identical results con-
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cerning the Court’s support for business. Both indicate a large
drop in support for business during the 1960s, the era of the
Warren Court, and a large rise in the Roberts Court. The
plunge in the early 2000s is a puzzle. But it may just be a statistical fluke. Two Terms, 2004 and 2005, account for the entire
drop, and there were only 5 cases in the first of these Terms in
the Business Litigant Dataset and 10 in the second Term. Of
the 15, the business litigant lost 10.
Figure 3
Fraction of Votes and Decisions in Support of
Business

III. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES’ VOTES IN THE
BUSINESS LITIGANT AND BUSINESS VERSUS BUSINESS
DATASETS
Table 7 ranks the Justices’ friendliness toward business
(column (1)) in the Business Litigant Dataset. We present separate results for 5-4 decisions (5-3 in the 1969 Term, when the
27
Court had only eight Justices ) and for the NYT sample. We

27. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 439.
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present our own coding (not Spaeth’s) of the fraction of conservative votes (column (4)) in the Business versus Business Dataset.
Column (1) reveals that five of the ten Justices since 1946
friendliest to business are serving currently and that two of
them—Alito and Roberts—rank first and second both for all
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and the NYT subset and
28
first and third for 5-4 decisions. Of the current Justices, only
Sotomayor is among the ten Justices least favorable to business, but she has cast relatively few votes (31, as shown in Table 7). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg are only slightly more liberal than the median Justice (Reed) but are among the six most
liberal Justices in 5-4 decisions. Justice Kagan has too few
votes to be included.
These rankings suggest, consistent with Figure 3, that the
Roberts Court is indeed highly pro-business—the conservatives
29
extremely so and the liberals only moderately liberal. We find
similar results for 5-4 decisions (column (2)), NYT decisions
(column (3)), and decisions in the Business versus Business
30
Dataset. But Roberts replaces Alito as the Justice most favor-

28. At the time of their nominations, the media deemed both Roberts and
Alito “good for business.” Critics, Supporters Battle over Roberts, CNN.COM
(Aug. 25, 2005, 1:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/24/roberts
.nomination/index.html; Shaheen Pasha, Business will Support Alito,
CNNMONEY (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/31/news/
economy/alito_nomination/.
29. A word of caution about the rankings: small differences in rankings
among the Justices are generally not statistically significant. For example, although the difference in ranking between Alito (#1) and Reed (#18) is significant, the difference between Alito and Thomas (#5) is not. Similarly, the difference between Reed and Clark (#30) is significant but not the difference
between Reed and Douglas (#26). And the difference between Scalia (#9) and
Rehnquist (#14) is significant but not the difference between Scalia and
O’Connor (#12). The rankings are even more suspect for 5-4, NYT, and business versus business cases because a number of Justices cast only a few votes
in such cases so that even large differences in ranking in those categories of
case are often not statistically significant.
30. The Spearman rank-order correlations across the four datasets are
very high and significant: .84 between columns (1) and (2), .85 between (1) and
(3), and .83 between (2) and (3), and .75 between columns (1) and (4). We exclude Goldberg from rankings involving 5-4 decisions because he cast only 2
votes and exclude Sotomayor from the business versus business rankings because she cast only 4 votes. Kagan is excluded from all comparisons because
she had very few votes (16 votes in column (1), 4 in columns (2) and (3), and 2
in column (4)).
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able to business in the Business versus Business Dataset (column (4)) followed by Thomas, Whittaker, Scalia, Alito, and
O’Connor, the last two being tied for fifth place.

Table 7
Rankings of Justices During The 1946–2011 Terms Based
on the Fraction of Votes for Business in the Business
Litigant and Business versus Business Datasets
Justice

Alito
Roberts
Jackson
Whittaker
Thomas
Kennedy
Frankfurter
Powell
Scalia
Harlan
Stewart
O’Connor
Burger
Rehnquist
Stevens
Burton
Vinson
Reed

Business
Litigant
Dataset
(1)
.630
(73)
.587
(75)
.570
(263)
.557
(158)
.549
(295)
.507
(412)
.501
(499)
.501
(457)
.499
(455)
.478
(572)
.474
(700)
.472
(529)
.461
(529)
.435
(837)
.423
(759)
.420
(407)
.412
(250)
.410
(349)

5-4 Cases
(2)

NYT
(3)

.929
(14)
.857
(14)
.861
(36)
.846
(26)
.696
(46)
.722
(72)
.788
(66)
.662
(74)
.667
(69)
.674
(46)
.671
(79)
.595
(79)
.587
(75)
.545
(123)
.402
(112)
.723
(47)
.588
(34)
.575
(40)

.750
(12)
.692
(13)
.565
(46)
.529
(34)
.632
(68)
.552
(116)
.511
(94)
.487
(152)
.465
(127)
.512
(123)
.488
(209)
.451
(153)
.449
(176)
.410
(261)
.446
(249)
.451
(71)
.468
(47)
.322
(59)

Business
versus
Business
(4)
.600
(15)
.750
(16)
.474
(19)
.632
(19)
.692
(52)
.556
(63)
.558
(52)
.592
(49)
.606
(71)
.593
(59)
.595
(79)
.600
(70)
.554
(56)
.584
(101)
.430
(107)
.514
(37)
.267
(15)
.406
(32)
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Souter
Breyer
Ginsburg
Marshall
White
Minton
Douglas
Sotomayor
Goldberg
Brennan
Clark
Warren
Murphy
Black
Rutledge
Fortas
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.403
(704)
.401
(284)
.397
(232)
.391
(261)
.383
(702)
.377
(942)
.360
(203)
.358
(902)
.355
(31)
.339
(109)
.328
(1064)
.310
(564)
.242
(513)
.238
(126)
.236
(798)
.233
(133)
.174
(92)
.404
(15,213)

.456
(103)
.349
(43)
.205
(39)
.214
(42)
.449
(98)
.495
(111)
.462
(13)
.359
(103)
0
(7)
.5
(2)
.362
(130)
.306
(49)
.146
(41)
.231
(26)
.207
(82)
.192
(26)
.143
(7)
.503
(1978)

.377
(231)
.446
(74)
.415
(53)
.475
(61)
.339
(233)
.327
(300)
.345
(29)
.337
(193)
.400
(5)
.290
(31)
.290
(321)
.317
(120)
.205
(122)
.185
(27)
.257
(179)
.259
(27)
.133
(30)
.397
(4050)

1451
.487
(78)
.560
(50)
.535
(43)
.447
(47)
.375
(80)
.411
(107)
.391
(23)
.219
(96)
—
—
.538
(13)
.290
(124)
.270
(63)
.191
(68)
.143
(7)
.184
(87)
.571
(7)
.333
(15)
.452
(1826)

AVERAGE
(Total Votes)
Notes:
(a) We exclude Kagan from table because she had only 16 votes in the Business Litigant Dataset and 1 vote in the Business versus Business Dataset; and we exclude
Sotomayor from the Business versus Business Dataset because she had only 4 votes.
(b) AVERAGE is the mean of the individual Justice weighted by the number of votes
for each Justice. Note that the Average includes the votes of all Justices including
Kagan and Sotomayor.
(c) Justices serving in 2012 are in bold.
(d) Number of votes by each Justice in parentheses.

There are a couple of anomalies in Table 7. One is Jackson’s strong support for business; he ranks third highest in all
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and second highest in 54 cases. As FDR’s Attorney General, he prosecuted businesses
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vigorously, in sync with the New Deal’s general hostility to
business interests. Even more surprising is that Ginsburg
jumps to 11 (above Scalia and just below Powell and Stewart)
in NYT cases. Nevertheless, Justices appointed by Republican
Presidents are on average considerably more likely to favor
business than Democratic appointees. In the Business Litigant
Dataset (column (1)), Republican Presidents appointed 13 of
the 15 Justices most favorable to business (Jackson and Frankfurter are the two in this group who were appointed by Democratic Presidents), and Democratic Presidents appointed 13 of
the 15 least business-friendly Justices, Brennan and Warren
being the two Justices in this group who were appointed by a
Republican President. On the current Court, no Justice appointed by a Republican President is less favorable to business
than any Justice appointed by a Democratic President. The results for the other three datasets are similar.
Two factors correlated with the high business-friendly
rankings of the Justices of the Roberts Court are the increase
in the number of business petitioners relative to the number of
business respondents (Figure 4) and the higher win rates for
business petitioners and business respondents (Figure 5).
When a business petitioner wins in the Supreme Court it
means that the Court has reversed an anti-business decision,
so the more pro-business the court, the more petitions by business litigants it can be expected to grant. And since business
petitioners have a higher win rate than business respondents,
the granting of more petitions by business litigants increases
the overall win rate of business even if the win rates of the two
groups are held constant.
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Figure 4
Fraction of Business Petitioners and Business
Respondents

Figure 5
Fraction of Wins for Business Petitioners and
Business Respondents
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Business petitioners accounted for 34.7% of the Business
Litigant Dataset from 1946 to 1968 (the Vinson and Warren
Courts), 54.0% from 1969 to 2004 (the Burger and Rehnquist
31
Courts), and 64.9% since 2005 (the Roberts Court). The increases in the separate win rates for business petitioners and
business respondents (Figure 5) have been more modest. For
business petitioners, the win rate is 45.0% in the Vinson and
Warren Courts, 54.4% in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
and 64.0% in the Roberts Court. For business respondents, the
win rates in those three Courts are 23.3%, 30.5%, and 37.0%,
32
respectively.
Table 8 classifies Justices as either appointed by a Republican President (R) or appointed by a Democratic President (D)
33
and as conservative (C), moderate (M), or liberal (L). We expect the difference in favor toward business between Cs and Ls
to be greater than the difference between Rs and Ds because
Republican Presidents have sometimes appointed liberal Justices (Brennan, Warren, Stevens, and Souter) and Democratic
Presidents have sometimes appointed conservative ones (Reed,
34
Burton, Vinson, Clark, and Minton).

31. A regression of the fraction of business petitioners on a time trend
variable over the 1946 to 2011 Terms yields a highly significant positive trend
of .005 per year (and a t-ratio of 5.95), while a regression of business respondents yields a negative coefficient of -.005 per year and a t-ratio of 7.49.
32. For the 1946 to 2011 time period, there is a positive and significant
trend in the win rate for business petitioners (.003 per year with a t-ratio of
3.44) and a positive but insignificant trend for business respondents (.001 per
year with a t-ratio of 1.01).
33. The conservative, moderate, and liberal classifications are based on an
assessment we developed from secondary sources and reported in chapter 3 of
The Behavior of Federal Judges. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note
10, at 101–51.
34. Republican Presidents appointed five of the eight moderates
(Whittaker, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor) and Democratic Presidents three (Frankfurter, Jackson, and White).
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Table 8
Fraction of Pro-Business Votes of Republican and
Democratic
Appointees and of Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal
Justices,
1946–2011 Terms
Business
Litigant
Dataset
5-4
NYT
Business
versus
Business
Vinson
Warren
Burger
Rehnquist
Roberts

All
(1)
.404
(15213)

R
(2)
.434**
(8334)

D
(3)
.367
(6879)

C
(4)
.444**
(4941)

M
(5)
.456**
(4250)

L
(6)
.335
(6022)

.502
(1978)
.397
(4050)
.452
(1826)

.548
(1146)
.428*
(2441)
.512**
(1077)

.438
(832)
.350
(1609)
.369
(749)

.615**
(642)
.453**
(1222)
.534**
(603)

.620**
(574)
.428*
(1219)
.529**
(473)

.316
(762)
.331
(1609)
.340
(750)

.389
(2195)
.345
(4446)
.426
(4586)
.441
(3313)
.519
(673)

—

.389
(2195)
.325
(2548)
.387
(1260)
.408
(679)
.411
(197)

.402**
(975)
.395*
(1250)
.442*
(1036)
.476**
(1302)
.614**
(378)

.540**
(487)
.442**
(1010)
.447*
(1967)
.445
(784)
—(2)

.271
(733)
.271
(2186)
.390
(1583)
.400
(1227)
.399
(293)

.371
(1898)
.441**
(3326)
.449*
(2634)
.563**
(476)

Notes:
(a) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level and two asterisks at
the .01 level. The statistical comparisons are between Rs and Ds; Cs and Ls; and Ms
and Ls.
(b) Standard errors are clustered by Justice.
(c) The conservative Justices are Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Vinson, Burton, Roberts,
Harlan, Alito, Reed, Minton, Clark, Burger, and Rehnquist; the moderates are White,
Whittaker, Frankfurter, Blackmun, Powell, Stewart, Jackson, and O’Connor; and the
liberals are Fortas, Goldberg, Souter, Kagan, Warren, Murphy, Black, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Marshall, Rutledge, Brennan, and Douglas.
(d) The number of votes is in parentheses.
(e) Since we cannot use a business win as a measure of a pro-business votes in the
Business versus Business Dataset, we use our Epstein-Landes-Posner conservative/liberal coding instead.
(f) Although the Business versus Business Dataset contains 255 cases, the number of
votes and the fraction of conservative votes are based on the 211 cases we were able
to classify as conservative or liberal (see Table 4).

Rs are significantly more favorable to business than Ds in
three of the four sets of cases (all, NYT, and Business versus
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35

Business); and likewise Cs and Ms vis-à-vis Ls. As expected,
the difference between Rs and Ds is smaller than between Cs
(or Ms) and Ls, but the relative difference is slight and not statistically significant. And notice that Cs and Ms are equally (to
each other) more favorable to business, which suggests that
hostility to business is strictly a liberal position. The ideological
division between Cs (or Ms) and Ls in the Business Litigant
Dataset is, not surprisingly, greater in the NYT cases.
The bottom half of Table 8 breaks down the differences in
friendliness to business in the Business Litigant Dataset by the
terms of the five Chief Justices since 1946. Notice the big increase in pro-business results since the Warren Court among
both liberals and conservatives and Ds and Rs, but not among
moderates (we have no explanation—we would expect moderates’ increase in pro-business sentiment to lie between the C
and L growth).
Table 9 differentiates support for business among Justices
of different ideologies prior to their appointment (the Justice’s
36
ex ante ideology). Using secondary sources, we classified Justices at the time of appointment as strongly conservative (SC),
moderately conservative (MC), moderately liberal (ML), or
strongly liberal (SL). This four-fold classification eliminates errors from using the party of the appointing President as a
proxy for ideology and corrects several anomalies in the widely
used Segal-Cover scores, which measure a Justice’s ideology at
the time of his appointment. Our results indicate that as expected the more conservative Justices tend to be friendlier to
business. The friendliest are the SCs, followed by MCs, then
MLs, and SLs, except that SLs are friendlier to business than
MLs in 5-4 cases. Not all the differences are statistically sig37
nificant, however.

35. We hypothesize that, for 5-4 decisions, Rs are only marginally significantly more favorable to business than Ds (p > .09) because there are fewer
observations for 5-4 decisions.
36. We developed this measure in EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note
10, at app. at 149–51.
37. SCs are significantly more favorable to business than MLs or SLs for
all cases, 5-4 decisions, NYT cases, and business versus business cases; SCs
are more favorable to business than MCs, but this difference is never significant; MCs are more favorable to business than MLs or SLs, but this is significant only in NYT and business versus business cases; and MLs are more supportive than SLs in three comparisons and less in one, but none of the
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Table 9
Fraction of Pro-Business Votes of Strongly Conservative,
Moderately Conservative, Moderately Liberal,
and Liberal Justices, 1946–2011 Terms

Business Litigant Dataset
5-4 Decisions
NYT
Business versus Business Dataset

SC
(1)
.462*
(2968)
.588*
(444)
.443**
(888)
.586**
(389)

MC
(2)
.422
(5365)
.542
(676)
.441*
(1436)
.477*
(660)

ML
(3)
.375
(3256)
.413
(412)
.338
(866)
.404
(401)

SL
(4)
.357
(3624)
.435
(446)
.336
(860)
.325
(376)

Notes:
(a) SC, MC, ML, and SL denote strongly conservative, moderately conservative,
moderately liberal, and strongly liberal Justices.
(b) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level and two asterisks at
the .01 level. The statistical comparisons are between SCs and SLs and between
MCs and the SLs.
(c) Standard errors are clustered by Justice.
(d) The number of votes is in parentheses.

Table 10 uses the fraction of votes coded conservative by
Spaeth as a proxy for friendliness toward business. If Spaeth’s
coding is accurate, we should find, as in Table 8, that the fraction of conservative votes is about the same for Cs and Ms and
greater than the fraction of such votes by Ls, and that the difference in the fraction of conservative votes between Cs and Ls
or Ms and Ls should be of similar magnitude to the differences
in the fraction of their votes in favor of business. Table 10 rejects both propositions except in the Business versus Business
cases, where Spaeth’s coding of ideology is very similar to ours
(see the rows labeled Business versus Business in Tables 8 and
10). In both Tables 8 and 10, Cs and Ms vote significantly more
conservatively than Ls, Cs and Ms vote about the same, and
the differences between Cs (or Ms) and Ls are also the same.
Although we disagreed with Spaeth’s coding in 36 of the 211

differences is significant.
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cases we classified, Tables 8 and 10 show that the disagreements largely cancel out, with the result that the mean fraction
of conservative votes for Cs, Ms, and Ls is nearly the same using either our or Spaeth’s ideology coding.
Table 10
Fraction of Conservative Votes of
Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal Justices,
1946–2011 Terms
C

M

L

(1)

(2)

(3)

.530**

.486**

.312

(4924)

(4237)

(6007)

.743**

.650**

.222

(642)

(574)

(762)

NYT

.540**

.455**

.282

(1215)

(1213)

(1604)

Business versus Business

.526**

.529**

.328

(603)

(473)

(750)

Business Litigant Dataset

5-4 Decisions

Dataset

Notes:
(a) Standard errors are clustered by Justice.
(b) The number of votes is in parentheses.
(c) The statistical tests are between Cs (or Ms) and Ls.

Other factors may bear on a Justice’s vote in a business
case besides attitude toward business, such as whether the
lower court ruled for or against the business party and whether
the federal government is supporting or opposing that party. To
control for these and other possibly relevant factors, we estimate logit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if
the Justice voted for the business party and 0 if he voted
against it. The independent variables are the party of the appointing President; whether the Justice is conservative, moderate, or liberal; the lower court decision; whether the federal
government is supporting or opposing the business party; the
subject area of the case; the Chief Justice at the time of the decision; and a set of dummy variables for whether the Solicitor
General filed an amicus curiae brief and if so on which side of
what kind of case. Since some of the independent variables are
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highly correlated with each other, we do not include all of them
in the same regression.
We include the identity of the Chief Justice as an independent variable for the following reason: The Chief Justice assigns the preparation of the majority opinion in any case in
which he is in the majority. Justices might try to court favor
with the Chief Justice in the hope of being rewarded with plum
assignments, and if so the appointment of a strongly probusiness or anti-business Chief Justice might influence fencesitters. Otherwise the only effect on the ideological slant of the
Court’s decisions from the appointment of a new Chief Justice
would be the ideological difference between him and his predecessor (or in Rehnquist’s case—since he was already a Justice
when he was appointed Chief Justice—between his predecessor
as Chief Justice and the Justice appointed to fill the vacancy
created by Rehnquist’s elevation to the Chief Justiceship: that
is, between Burger and Scalia). The arbitrary convention of regarding as analytically meaningful the period in which the
Court has the same Chief Justice may lead to an exaggerated
expectation of the Chief Justice’s influence on the other Jus38
tices.
Table 11 defines the variables and states the mean value of
each one, and Tables 12 through 14 report the regression re39
sults.

38. There are historical exceptions, such as John Marshall, of course, but
also Charles Evans Hughes.
39. We report the marginal effects of each variable at the mean values of
all variables because those effects are easier to interpret than logit coefficients. The marginal effects measure the change in the probability of business
winning per unit change in the independent variable, whereas logit coefficients measure the change in the log of the ratio of the probability of business
winning to the probability of business losing per unit change in the independent variable.
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Table 11
Definitions of Variables in Regression Analysis
Variable
Pro-Business

Definition
Mean
1 if Justice voted in favor of business and 0
.404
if Justice opposed business
R
1 if Justice appointed by Republican
President
C
1 if Justice Conservative
.322
M
1 if Justice Moderate; the omitted category
.284
is if Justice Liberal
L
Liberal Justice (the omitted dummy vari.395
able)
LCT Pro-Business
1 if lower court reached a pro-business de.541
cision
Federal Govt
1 if federal government party opposed
.429
business
SG pro-Business
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on
.057
Petitioner
behalf of business petitioner
SG anti-Business
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on
.060
Petitioner
behalf of non-business petitioner
SG pro-Business
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on
.018
Respondent
behalf of Business Respondent
SG anti-Business
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on
.051
Respondent
behalf of Non-Business Respondent
Term
Term of Court
—
Core Economic Category
Defined as before in Table 1
.562
Chief Dummies
Dummy Variables for terms of each Chief
—
Justice, with Warren as the omitted
category
Note: Mean is calculated for all cases in the Business Litigant Dataset. The mean for
Core Economic Category differs from the mean in Table 1 because this table is based
on the number of observations we include in the regression analysis (15,114, not
15,213). We exclude 99 votes because we are missing information for some of the variables.

Several points about the variables are noteworthy:
(1) About 40% of the votes of the Justices are in favor of the
business litigant, compared to 54% of the votes of the judges in
the lower court. Since petitioners in the Supreme Court lost in
the lower court, this means that non-business petitioners are
54%, and business petitioners 46%, of the petitioners in the
40
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset. Given the Supreme

40. Non-business petitioners constitute 46% of the cases that are decided
by a 5-4 vote and 51% of the NYT cases.
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Court’s tendency to reverse the lower court, we expect a negative sign on the regression coefficient of the lower court variable.
(2) The federal government is the party opposing the business litigant in 43% of our cases. Since the government tends to
do better than other litigants in the Supreme Court, we expect
a negative coefficient on this variable too.
(3) The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief in
18.6% of the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset (the sum of
the means of the four SG variables in Table 11). We expect a
positive coefficient on the SG variable when he supports the
business litigant and a negative coefficient when he opposes.
This hypothesis derives from the Solicitor General’s record of
41
success as an amicus curiae, though it is unclear whether that
success results from his ability to influence the Justices, from a
political or personal motive of wanting to seem to influence
them which inclines him to file briefs only in cases he expects
to win, or from the fact that the Supreme Court favors the federal government in most cases. We can shed a little light on
this question, however, by comparing the Solicitor General’s
success rate in all cases to his success rate in just the 5-4 cases.
Assuming that he finds it harder to predict who will be the
winners in such cases, we should find smaller and less significant effects of the Solicitor General’s amicus filings in those
cases if causation runs primarily from the predicted outcome of
the case to Solicitor General’s decision to file an amicus brief. If
on the other hand his amicus curiae briefs have a significant
impact on a Justices’ vote, we should find that he is equally
successful in 5-4 as in other decisions.

41. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK &
AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
CIAL DECISIONS 23–28 (2012).

RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
COURT: EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE AND JUDI-

1462

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1431

Table 12
Logit Regressions of Justices’ Votes for Business in All
Cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, 5-4 Decisions, NYT
Cases, and Cases in the Business versus Business Dataset,
1946–2011 Terms
Variable

President’s Party
Conservative
Moderate
Lower Court
U.S. Opposition
SG Amicus Business
Petitioner
SG Amicus Non
Business Petitioner
SG Amicus Business
Respondent
SG Amicus Non
Business Respondent
SG Amicus Liberal
Position
SG Amicus
Conservative Position
Chief Dummies
Core Business
2

5-4

NYT

(3)
—

(4)
—

-.155**
(8.18)
-.096**
(5.05)
.151**
(5.55)
-.204**
(7.56)
.219**
(7.41)
-.194**
(5.96)
—

.108**
(4.38)
.124**
(3.62)
-.155**
(8.04)
-.096**
(5.08)
.155**
(5.60)
-.204**
(7.36)
.222**
(7.68)
-.194**
(5.70)
—

.299**
(6.13)
.317**
(4.79)
-.024
(0.68)
-.004
(0.09)
-.022
(0.34)
.043
(0.81)
.007
(0.10)
-.001
(0.01)
—

.111**
(3.52)
.104*
(2.42)
-.124**
(4.26)
-.061*
(2.05)
.184**
(3.45)
-.069
(1.43)
.323**
(6.09)
-.127
(1.77)
—

—

—

—

—

Yes
-.040
(1.95)
.05
15114

Yes**
-.041
(1.93)
.06
15114

Yes
.015
(0.27)
.06
1960

Yes
-.061**
(3.09)
.06
4032

Business Litigant
Dataset
(1)
.054
(1.74)
—
—

(2)
—

Business
versus
Business
(5)
—
.200**
(5.36)
.204**
(3.79)
-.108**
(3.61)
—
—
—
—
—
-.105**
(3.47)
.155**
(5.31)
Yes**
-.045
(1.74)
.08
1817

R
Number of Votes
Notes:
(a) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level and two asterisks at
the .01 level (t-statistics are in parentheses).
(b) Standard errors clustered on Justice (36 clusters).
(c) In the Business vs. Business regression (column (5)) we use our ideology coding of
the decision for the Justice’s vote and Spaeth’s ideology coding for the lower court decision and for the two SG amicus variables.

The regression results in Table 12 indicate that Rs are
more likely than Ds to vote in favor of business (column (1)).
But the effect is modest—an increase of .05 or 12.5% relative to
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the mean probability of .40—and only marginally significant
(p > .083). We experimented with two other measures of ex ante
ideology: Segal-Cover scores and our fourfold ideology measure
(SC, MC, ML, SL). The regression coefficient for Segal-Cover
indicates that the probability of voting for business increases
by .086 (or nearly 22% relative to the mean probability of .40)
as one moves from the Justice most confidently expected to be
liberal (a Segal-Cover score of zero for Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rutledge, Murphy, Fortas, and Jackson—whose SegalCover score, consistent with our earlier observation about
Jackson’s anomalous business votes, did not accurately predict
those votes, indicating the limitations of an ex ante measure of
ideology as a predictor of judicial behavior) to the most conservative Justice (a Segal-Cover score of 1, achieved only by Justice Scalia). Substituting our fourfold ex ante ideology measure,
we find that strongly and moderately conservative Justices are
equally likely to support business and both are more favorable
to business than moderately and strongly liberal Justices; but
none of the regression coefficients is statistically significant.
In the next set of regressions in Table 12 (columns (2)–(5)),
we classify each Justice as conservative, moderate, or liberal on
the basis of secondary literature that covers the period both before and after the Justice’s appointment and so combines as42
sessments of ex ante and ex post ideology. This measure is superior to Segal-Cover scores and our fourfold ex ante
classification because it utilizes more information and eliminates errors in cases in which judges’ ex ante and ex post ide43
ologies differ. Using this measure we find that conservatives
and moderates are significantly more likely to vote in favor of
business than liberals (the omitted dummy variable). For all
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset (column (2)) and NYT
cases (column (4)), we find a .10 to .12 increase in the probability of favoring business for conservatives and moderates compared to liberals (a 25 to 30% increase relative to the mean
probability of favoring business) and no significant difference

42. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
43. For example, Justice Blackmun was predicted to be strongly conservative but turned out to be a moderate; Justices Souter and Stevens were predicted to be moderately conservative but turned out to be liberals; and Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson were predicted to be strongly liberal but turned out
to be moderate.
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between conservatives and moderates. The difference between
conservatives and moderates on the one hand and liberals on
the other is substantially greater in 5-4 decisions (column (3))
than in all cases or NYT cases—a .30 to .32 increase in the
probability of supporting business for conservatives and moderates than liberals (more than a 60% increase relative to the
mean probability of .49). The gap is about .19 (the difference
between the probabilities of .30 and .11), indicating that conservatives and moderates are three times more likely to favor
business in 5-4 cases than in other cases.
Regarding the other variables in Table 12:
(1) A business win in the lower court significantly decreases the probability that business will win in the Supreme
Court except in 5-4 cases. Holding constant the other variables
at their mean values, the probability of a Justice’s voting in favor of business decreases by .12 to .16 (between 32 and 42%
relative to the mean probability of .38) if business won in the
lower court. The relation is not causal but rather reflects the
fact that the Court reverses more cases than it affirms. Unlike
other courts, it does not have to hear all appeals, and it prefers
to take cases to reverse than to affirm because reversal corrects
what the Court considers an error and affirmance does not,
unless the affirmance eliminates a conflict among lower courts,
the conflict implying that one or more courts have erred.
(2) When the federal government opposes the business
party (U.S. Opposition), a Justice is significantly less likely (in
the range of -.06 to -.10) to vote for business except in 5-4 cases.
This holds in each of the separate regressions for liberal, moderate, and conservative Justices, though we would have expected conservative Justices to be less sympathetic than the
other Justices to the federal government in business cases.
(3) The four Solicitor General amicus curiae variables have
the predicted signs and are significant in all regressions except
for 5-4 decisions. Apart from those decisions, when the Solicitor
General files an amicus curiae brief supporting the business
petitioner the probability of business winning increases by .15
to .18 (or 34 to 53% relative to the 38% mean probability that
business wins). When he supports the business respondent, the
increases are larger (ranging from .22 to .33), but the difference
is not statistically significant. The Solicitor General is equally
successful when he files an amicus curiae brief opposing the
business party. The probability of business winning declines
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(although the coefficients are significant in only nine of the
twelve cases and marginally significant for the other three) and
the declines are not significantly different in absolute magnitude from when the Solicitor General favors the business party.
The absence of any significant effects of the SG variable in
5-4 decisions is consistent with the Solicitor General’s not in44
fluencing a Justice’s vote. Another implication of no influence
however is that the Solicitor General would be less likely to file
amicus curiae briefs in cases that turn out to be decided 5-4
than in other cases, in order to minimize losses. The data do
not support this hypothesis. The Solicitor General filed amicus
briefs in 20% (44 cases) of 5-4 cases and in 18% (283 cases) of
all other cases.
A complication, however, is that about 28% of the amicus
briefs filed by the Solicitor General (64 of the 227 amicus briefs
in cases in the Business Litigant Dataset in the 1971 to 2009
Terms) are requested by the Court and so do not reflect the Solicitor General’s choice to file briefs in cases he expects to win.
If we eliminate the requested briefs from the analysis, the Solicitor General filed amicus briefs in 21% of 5-4 cases (28 of 133
cases) and 17% of all other cases (135 of 785 cases) in the Business Litigant Dataset in the 1971 to 2009 Terms (the only
Terms we have data on requested briefs). Thus the adjustment
in the data to distinguish requested from volunteered amicus
briefs does not disturb our rejection of the hypothesis that the
Solicitor General is more likely to file an amicus brief in cases
he expects to win.
(4) The regression results for whether the case is core or
non-core indicate less judicial favor for business in the core, although the regression coefficient is significant only in the NYT
cases. The Chief Justice dummy variables are jointly significant in two of the five regressions, and that significance is attributable to the significant positive coefficient on the Roberts
Court dummy. We explore this issue shortly.
(5) None of the independent variables except the Justice’s

44. The regression equations (1), (2), and (4) in Table 12 include both 5-4
cases and all other cases although 5-4 cases make up less than 13% of the decisions in the Business Litigant Dataset. A cleaner test of the causation would
compare 5-4 cases to all other cases rather than to all cases. To do this, we reestimated equations (1), (2), and (4) without the 5-4 cases. The results are essentially unchanged from the regressions reported in Table 12.
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ideological identity is significant in 5-4 decisions. This confirms
the proposition that when the Justices divide closely in a case,
it is because the case has significant ideological stakes.
In the regression involving the 211 cases in the Business
versus Business Dataset that we were able to classify as conservative or liberal (column (5)), we add two new independent
variables: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Solicitor General
filed a brief in support of a liberal lower court decision and 0
otherwise, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Solicitor
General filed a brief supporting a conservative lower court de45
cision and 0 otherwise. We again find that conservative and
moderate Justices are equally likely to vote conservative and
significantly more likely to vote conservative than liberals are.
We also find that probability of the petitioner’s winning is .11
higher if the lower court decision was in favor of the respondent, confirming the propensity of the Supreme Court to reverse in the cases it agrees to review. And both Solicitor General variables are highly significant and in the predicted
direction—an amicus brief supporting a party increases that
party’s probability of winning by between .11 and .16.
Table 13 presents separate logit regressions for conservative, moderate, and liberal Justices. Each regression includes
the same independent variables as in Table 12. We estimate
separate regressions for the Business Litigant and Business
versus Business Datasets. We do not present the full regressions but only the results for the Chief Justice dummy variables (the Warren Court is the omitted Chief Justice variable in
46
the regressions). The regressions do not test the personal influence of the Chief Justice, but instead the hypotheses suggested by Table 8 that conservatives and liberals have become
more favorable to business over time while moderates have not
changed. The Chief Justice variable simply denotes the different Court eras since 1946.

45. The Solicitor General filed 61 amicus briefs of the 199 cases in the
Business versus Business dataset, 38 supporting a liberal and 23 supporting a
conservative lower court decision. Note that we use Spaeth’s conservative/liberal classification of the lower court decision.
46. The results for the other independent variables in the regressions are
very similar to those in Table 12.
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Table 13
Logit Regressions of Votes for Business of
Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal
Justices, 1946–2011 Terms
Business Litigant
Dataset
Vinson
Burger
Rehnquist
Roberts
No. Observations
Business versus
Business Dataset
Vinson
Burger
Rehnquist
Roberts

C

M

L

(1)
.022
(0.40)
.023
(0.43)
.064
(1.26)
.143**
(3.07)
4890

(2)
.106*
(1.98)
-.042
(1.49)
-.048
(1.00)
—

(3)
-.09
(0.35)
.077**
(3.02)
.086**
(3.37)
.048
(1.81)
5980

-.199*
(2.58)
.114
(1.13)
.044
(0.47)
.255*
(2.52)
599

-.233**
(3.87)
-.009
(0.18)
-.104
(1.42)
—

4242

.151*
(2.36)
.183**
(6.68)
.215**
(3.74)
.289**
(7.14)
746

No. Observations
471
Notes:
(a) Warren is omitted Chief Justice Variable.
(b) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level
and two asterisks at the .01 level (t-statistics are in parentheses).
(c) Standard errors clustered on Justice (36 clusters).

In the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, conservative
Justices have, beginning with the Burger Court, been on the
whole more favorable to business than conservative Justices in
the Warren Court. This tendency, however, is significant only
in the Roberts Court, where a conservative Justice has a .14
higher probability of voting for business (a 32% higher probability relative to the mean probability of winning of .44) than a
conservative Justice in the Warren Court (holding constant the
other variables in Table 12). Although neither the Burger nor
the Rehnquist dummy variable is significant, they are jointly
significant, implying that conservative Justices in those Courts
were .02 to .06 more likely to favor business than conservatives
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in the Warren Court. Liberal Justices have also become significantly more supportive of business (.05 to .09) since the Warren
Court, although the Roberts variable is only marginally significant (p > .07). There has been no shift in support for business
among moderate Justices since the Warren Court. Although the
regression coefficients for moderates in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts are negative, neither coefficient is significant
and they are jointly insignificant. As in Table 8, moderates in
the Vinson Court are significantly more supportive of business
than moderates in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts
(there have been no moderates as yet in the Roberts Court).
The second part of Table 13 presents regressions for the
Business versus Business Dataset. We have only 599 votes for
conservatives, 471 for moderates, and 746 for liberals in this
dataset, and these numbers are too small to enable strong conclusions. Still, the regressions do confirm that both conservatives and liberals have become more favorable to business
starting with the Burger Court, while there have been no comparable changes among moderate Justices.
Last we analyze the votes of the five Justices who served in
both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Because these Justices all heard
the same cases (except for the occasional recusal), we can test
whether their support for business increased between the two
periods (1986–2004 and 2005–2010). This allows us to explore
whether the more favorable results for business during the
Roberts Court than during the Rehnquist Court was caused by
just the addition of Alito and Roberts (who—remember—rank
in Table 7 as the most favorable to business of all Justices since
1946) or also by other conservative Justices’ becoming friendlier to business during the Roberts Court. Maybe though conservative they were not as interested in business cases as Roberts and Alito and were thus content to go along with them in
order to cement a conservative majority by minimizing disagreement within the majority coalition.
Table 14 presents separate logit regressions for the three
conservative and two liberal Justices using the same independent variables as in Table 13 but including a dummy variable to
denote the Chief Justice (= 1 if Roberts and 0 if Rehnquist) and
excluding the Term variable. Since our interest is in whether
the five Justices’ regard for business changed between the
Rehnquist and Roberts Court, we report only the results for the
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Chief Justice variable. Table 14 reveals that the three conservative Justices have become significantly more favorable to
business—the probability of their voting in favor of business increased from .52 to .56. In contrast, the two liberal Justices became significantly less favorable to business; their probability
of voting for business fell from .38 to .32. A possible explanation
is that the increasing conservatism of the Court resulted in the
Court’s taking cases in which the conservative position was
weaker than previously, leading to more opposition by liberal
Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by
those Justices in business cases.
Table 14
Logit Regressions of Votes for Business of
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer During Rehnquist’s and Roberts’s Tenures,
1994–2011 Terms

Chief Dummy

Scalia, Kennedy &
Thomas
.038**
(3.45)
697

Ginsberg & Breyer
-.068**
(8.86)
453

Number of Votes
Notes:
(a) Two asterisks signify statistical significance at the .01 level (tstatistics in parentheses).
(b) Standard errors are clustered by Justice.
(c) Other independent variables in each regression include the lowercourt decision, whether the federal government opposed the business
party, four SG amicus variables, and whether the case was in the
core or non-core economic category.

CONCLUSION: WHAT WE HAVE FOUND
The United States has become a more conservative country
since the 1960s. One manifestation of this trend has been a relaxation of regulatory controls over business that began with
the deregulation movement of the late 1970s and gathered
momentum in the Reagan Administration, the two Bush Administrations, and the Clinton Administration. One of our concerns in this article has been the extent to which the probusiness trend has manifested itself in decisions by the Supreme Court and in votes of the individual Justices (which are
not the same thing). Another has been to explore the ideological
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implications of pro-business decisions, and in particular to determine whether they are invariably conservative. That endeavor has caused us to raise questions about the ideological
classifications of Supreme Court business decisions in the influential Spaeth Database of Supreme Court decisions.
Our key empirical tool has been the creation of two new
datasets, one, the Business Litigant Dataset, consisting of all
1759 Supreme Court decisions in the 1946 through 2011 Terms
of Court in which a business entity was on one side of the case
and a non-business entity expected to have an adverse view of
business, such as a union or the government, was on the other
side; and the other (and much smaller) Business versus Business Dataset, consisting of the 255 cases in which there were
business entities on both sides of the case. Although these
datasets are subsets of Spaeth’s Supreme Court database, most
previous studies of the Court’s business cases have been limited
to cases classified by Spaeth as “economic activity” cases, which
account for only 40% of the cases in our Business Litigant
Dataset and 43% of the cases in that dataset plus our Business
versus Business Dataset. Moreover, more than two-thirds of
the cases in which the Chamber of Commerce has filed an
amicus curiae brief are outside Spaeth’s economic activity category, though this figure drops to 50% if tax and labor cases are
added to that category to form a larger category that we call the
“core economic category.”
In the sample of cases (147 + 255 = 402) that we classified
ideologically, we found ourselves disagreeing with Spaeth’s
classifications in about 34% of the cases, because we disagreed
about the classifications or about whether a case could be classified ideologically.
Over the span covered by our study, business litigants
have generally fared worse in the Supreme Court than their
nonbusiness opponents, receiving only 40% of the Justices’
votes and winning only 38% of the cases.
We find that decisions in favor of a business litigant over a
non-business litigant are not uniformly conservative or the opposite decisions uniformly liberal; only 67.5% of the decisions
(and 67.4% of the Justices’ votes) fit the pattern of business
wins-conservative and business loses-liberal. And in subsets
consisting for example of business cases involving civil liberties
(such as a suit against a business for libel), the percentage is
substantially lower.
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We expected, and found, that a higher proportion of
unanimous or near-unanimous decisions were unclassifiable
ideologically because they were less likely to involve ideological
stakes; but the difference was not statistically significant. We
also found that within the core economic category business
wins are highly positively correlated with conservative voting,
but the sign is reversed in the case of business wins in the noncore business areas.
Whether measured by decisions or Justices’ votes, a plunge
in warmth toward business during the 1960s (the heyday of the
Warren Court) was quickly reversed; and the Roberts Court is
much friendlier to business than either the Burger or
Rehnquist Courts, which preceded it, were. The Court is taking
more cases in which the business litigant lost in the lower court
and reversing more of these—giving rise to the paradox that a
decision in which certiorari is granted when the lower court decision was anti-business is more likely to be reversed than one
in which the lower court decision was pro-business. The Roberts Court also has affirmed more cases in which business is
the respondent than its predecessor Courts did.
We are interested not only in the Court’s decisions but also
in the attitudes toward business of the individual Justices, and
we use data on their general ideological leanings to relate their
ideological priors to their votes in business cases. We also consider the relation of their votes to such factors as the participation in the case of the Chamber of Commerce or the U.S. Solicitor General.
We find that five of the ten Justices who, over the span of
our study (the 1946 through 2011 Terms), have been the most
favorable to business are currently serving, with two of them
ranking at the very top among the thirty-six Justices in our
study. Justices appointed by Republican Presidents are notably
more favorable to business than Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents, and on the current Court no Republicanappointed Justice is less favorable to business than any Democrat. Justices whose pre-appointment ideology was conservative
also tend to be more favorable to business. Over time, Justices
appointed by Democratic Presidents—not only those appointed
by Republican Presidents—have become more favorable to
business, consistent with the general growth in the public’s favorable attitude toward business.
We used regression analysis to isolate additional factors
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that are correlated with (and might influence) Justices’ votes in
business cases. We find for example that the Solicitor General’s
position in a business case is highly correlated with the Justices’ votes in the case, though we do not know whether the relation is a causal one; it may just be that the Solicitor General
is good at picking winners. We find that after the appointment
of Roberts and Alito, the other three conservative Justices on
the Court became more favorable to business, and we conjecture that the three may not have been as interested in business
as Roberts and Alito and decided to go along with them to forge
a more solid conservative majority across a broad range of issues.

